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WAS THE FIRST WOMAN HANGED IN
NORTH CAROLINA A "BATTERED
SPOUSE?"
JEFFREY P. GRAY*
It is a gruesome tale, now more folklore than fact. It is the oft
told story of the pioneer wife who slipped her baby girl from the
arms of her sleeping husband, chopped him to pieces with an axe,
and then hid throughout the hillside the parts of his body she
could not burn. She hung for her crime, but only after a daring
escape attempt and numerous requests for clemency.
Could she have been a "battered spouse?" In some states in
this nation, present day law might have excused her crime on that
ground, but not in North Carolina, and especially not in the early
1800's.
Her name was Frankie Silver. To many North Carolinians,
the name sounds familiar; they just cannot tell you why. Her
crime earned her a place in William Powell's Dictionary of North
Carolina Biography.' Muriel Sheppard wrote about the oral tra-
dition of the murder in her book about the Toe River Valley, Cab-
ins in the Laurel.2 Frankie Silver has had among her post-
mortem defenders the great U.S. Senator, jurist, and self-pro-
claimed "county lawyer" Sam J. Ervin, Jr., as well as Burke
County elementary school students who have sought a pardon for
Frankie from the Governor.
The story of Frankie Silver and her crime is a difficult one to
tell with accuracy. History has clouded many of the facts, and oral
renditions-repeated for generations -have fogged the truth. In
the winter of 1831, Charles and Frankie Silver lived in a sparsely
populated section of Burke County (now Mitchell County) at a
* Jeffrey P. Gray is a graduate of Campbell University School of Law and
has been an Assistant Attorney General in the North Carolina Department of
Justice for ten years. In addition to representing agency clients, he advises local
law enforcement officers on legal issues, including problems associated with
domestic violence. He briefed and argued the only two cases where the North
Carolina Supreme Court has considered the battered spouse syndrome.
1. WILLIAM S. POWELL, DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY 346
(1994).
2. MURIEL EARLEY SHEPPARD, CABiNs IN THE LAUREL 25-39 (1935).
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bend in the Toe River. They had a one-year-old daughter, Nancy.
During the day of December 22nd, Charles had chopped and
stacked hardwood for the fireplace in their one-room cabin to last
them over the Christmas holiday. He lay sleeping by the fire with
the baby in his arms. At some point while he was sleeping,
Frankie removed the baby to safety, then decapitated Charles
with an ax. She chopped his body up and burned much of it in the
fireplace, depleting the entire three to four-day store of firewood.
The parts of her husband she could not burn, she hid in a hollow
log on the hillside or buried in shallow holes under rocks and logs.
She scrubbed the wooden floor clean and, using the same axe,
chipped the blood spatters off the hewn wooden mantel.
She then went to visit Charles's parents very early on the
morning of December 23rd and announced she had done her wash-
ing and scouring. She told his parents a concocted story that
Charles had walked across the frozen river the day before to get
his Christmas liquor and had not returned. She begged his family
to search for him. Her story, however, quickly became implausi-
ble. She was later charged for her crime.
This is the most commonly repeated story. The debate about
what occurred in that one-room cabin on a cold winter night 165
years ago continues, and becomes especially heated, when the
motives for the crime are proffered. Charles's family members-
then, and over 150 years later-contend that Frankie killed
Charles with malicious intent; many assumed her motive was
jealousy over Charles's unfaithfulness. Others, including
Nicholas A. Woodfin, who has been alleged to be Frankie's defense
counsel and who later became a very prominent attorney in Ashe-
ville, argued that Frankie did not willfully kill Charles. They
believe he came home drunk and began beating her with a stick
and that Frankie struck back and killed him in self-defense.
Woodfin claimed that this is the story Frankie told him. He stated
that Frankie's death "was a miscarriage of justice" and that she
was "unjustly hanged."3 It was to this version of the facts that
"Senator Sam" was an adherent.4 It is from this version of the
facts that springs a defense for a modern day Frankie Silver.
Frankie lived in an isolated area, with little or no support
group outside her and her husband's immediate families. She
3. EDWARD W. PHIFER, BURKE, THE I-hsTORy OF A NORTH CAROLINA COUNTY
393-94 (1977).
4. S.J. Ervin, Jr., Frankie Silver, MORGANTON NEws-HERALD April 3, 1924,
March 27, 1964, January 29, February 13,and March 28, 1968.
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may have been abused-maybe repeatedly throughout her mar-
riage-and the abuse became too much. Picture her on the day of
the killing. The cycle of violence started anew, and her husband
beat her with a stick during a drunken rage. He fell asleep. Inca-
pacitated and defenseless, she struck. Afterwards, she was in
denial and feigned no knowledge of what occurred. Frankie Sil-
ver's possible reaction has been repeated many times since that
cold night in 1831. Advocates for a new concept of self-defense in
modern times have given her actions and reaction a name: the
"battered spouse syndrome."
The "battered spouse syndrome" has yet to be recognized by
either the medical community or the courts as an accepted psycho-
logical malady. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM IV) used to diagnose psychological disorders does
not contain an entry for such a syndrome. However, recognition of
its symptoms is gradually becoming accepted. As a theory to
explain a behavior pattern, it originated in the extensive research
and writings of Dr. Lenore E. Walker, a psychologist who devel-
oped this syndrome as a vehicle to assist women in explaining
their experiences in the context of a criminal trial where the
woman has used force against her spouse.5 A "syndrome" is gen-
erally defined as a group of signs and symptoms that collectively
indicate or characterize a disease, disorder, or abnormality.6 Such
being the case, "battered spouse syndrome" is aptly named
because of its reliance on a variety of broad-based "signs" or
"symptoms."
In her writings, Dr. Walker has outlined a theory based on
her research with battered spouses regarding the structure of a
battering relationship from the perspective of the battered spouse.
This theory has most frequently been explained as the "cycle of
violence." According to Dr. Walker's theory, the abuse cycle con-
sists of three recognizable phases: 1) the tension building phase,
2) an acute battering incident, and 3) a contrition phase. During
5. See, e.g, Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women And Learned Helplessness, 2
VICTIMOLOGY 525 (1977); L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE (1989); L. WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN (1979); Lenore E. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome And
Self-defense, 16 NOTRE DAME L.J. ETHics & PUB. Pol'y 321 (1992); Lenore E.
Walker, A Response To Elizabeth M. Schneider's Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony On Battering, 9
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. (1986); Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the Juror's Den:
Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1 (1982).
6. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, NEW COLLEGE EDITION 1305
(1979).
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the tension building phase, minor battering incidents occur and
escalate over time. This is generally the longest phase of the
cycle. Next occurs an acute battering incident-the second
phase-which is distinguished by the batterer's loss of control and
the unpredictability and severity of the beatings. This is the
shortest phase, ranging from two to 24 hours. During the third
and final phase, the batterer typically expresses tremendous
remorse, promises to stop the violence, and acts in an apologetic,
loving, and kind way. In some cases, the third phase may disap-
pear over time or merely become a lull in the hostilities.
This "cycle of violence" is explained in Dr. Walker's writings
using additional psychological theories such as "intermittent rein-
forcement," i.e., when certain behavior occurs at irregular and
unpredictable intervals, that behavior becomes difficult to modify
or extinguish, and "learned helplessness," i.e., when an animal
that is subjected continuously to situations over which it has no
control ultimately loses the ability to respond even when control is
returned. Other factors, in addition to evidence of the existence of
a "cycle," are added on a case-by-case basis as signs or symptoms
to support the existence of "battered spouse syndrome." Commen-
tators, as well as expert defense witnesses in criminal prosecu-
tions, have also identified several factors that support the
existence of the syndrome. It is from these additional factors that
an argument could be made that Frankie Silver suffered from bat-
tered spouse syndrome long before psychology became an accepted
science.
Specifically, these factors are a feeling-real or perceived-of
isolation, fear of leaving the batterer, prevailing social standards,
financial dependence, and a sense of loyalty. Isolation can be geo-
graphic (as in Frankie Silver's case), or merely isolation from
friends and family. Frequently, this isolation is forced by the bat-
tering spouse. The fear of leaving can be multi-faceted, including
a fear that the husband will kill her, their children or anyone who
helps her escape, or a fear that she will have no one to support her
if she does leave or will not be able to maintain financial indepen-
dence. Social standards can include socio-economic standards and
beliefs regarding the role of wives and women and can be based in
culture or religion. 7 However, the social standards of Frankie Sil-
7. See S. SCHECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 1-2, 53-58 (1982); A.
BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KnL 55-74 (1987); Mather, The Skeleton In
The Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, And Expert Testimony,
39 MERCER L. REv. 545, 553-54 (1988); See also State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253,
314 [Vol. 19:311
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/3
A "BATTERED SPOUSE"
ver's time are not the strongest indicators of battered spouse
syndrome.
How Frankie Silver committed her crime provides persuasive
evidence of battered spouse syndrome. Under the facts as they
are most commonly accepted, she struck while her "batterer" was
asleep-a recurrent theme in battered spouse cases where the
retaliatory act has resulted in a criminal prosecution. This fact
alone negated any argument for self-defense in North Carolina in
1832 as it would have negated any such argument in 1996. Where
the victim was sleeping and he battered spouse syndrome is prof-
fered to justify a defense of self-defense, there have been many
questions about the syndrome's value as a scientific theory and as
a justification for a killing.
Cases where a wife has killed a husband are by no means
unusual. Self-defense (with evidence of the "cycle" and physical
violence), as well as a general plea of temporary insanity, have
been, and are, frequently successful as defenses. But the defense
of "abuse" as a justification did not fully reach the public eye until
Farrah Fawcett appeared in the made-for-television movie, The
Burning Bed.' Based on an actual case, The Burning Bed told the
story of Francine Hughes, who killed her sleeping husband after
years of abuse; she was exonerated. Hughes' case is considered
the landmark case for recognizing the plight of battered women.
Ironically, though, Hughes premised her defense on the ground of
temporary insanity and did not present a defense based purely on
abuse by her victim.
In many instances, the law that governs self-defense will
allow an excuse where the wife is actually being battered and
strikes back, dealing a lethal blow.9 The situation is different,
264-66, 378 S.E.2d 8, 15-16 (1989); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1272 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1986); lbu-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. The Burning Bed (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 8, 1984).
9. Traditionally, the law in North Carolina has recognized the right to
defend oneself when presented with a threat of death or great bodily injury.
State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 70-74, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659-60 (1987). Self-defense
may be either "perfect" or "imperfect." These definitions differ in essential
elements and in classification as either justification or excuse. A defendant is
entitled to an instruction on perfect self-defense if the evidence tends to show
that at the time of the killing: 1) the defendant believed it necessary to kill the
victim to save himself from imminent death or great bodily harm; 2) the
circumstances as they appeared to the defendant were sufficient to create such a
belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; 3) the defendant was not the
aggressor in the confrontation; and 4) the defendant did not use more force than
1997] 315
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however, when, as in Hughes' case-and arguably Frankie Sil-
ver's-the batterer is asleep. The law, based on traditional theo-
ries of self-defense, does not allow an excuse when the victim is
asleep.
The cornerstone of self-defense is the concept of imminence.
The use of force in response to a threat of violence is considered
timely only when the defendant reasonably perceived that death
or great bodily harm by the attacker is imminent. 10 To propo-
nents of the battered spouse syndrome as a defense to murder, the
concept of imminence is non-specific; that is, violence resulting
from an ever-present threat or an attack which could occur at any
time.1 North Carolina, as well as a majority of other jurisdic-
tions, defines "imminence" more restrictively. In terms of self-
defense, "imminence" is generally defined as "immediately neces-
sary on the present occasion."' 2 Thus, under this definition, a vic-
tim who kills a sleeping abuser does not meet the criterion of
imminence. Such was Frankie Silver's case in 1832 in North Car-
olina, just as it would be today.
Coincidentally, North Carolina has the distinction of having
the most frequently cited case where the defense of abused spouse
was argued when the victim was asleep, State v. Norman. 3 In
Norman, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue
of the battered spouse syndrome as a defense to murder in a case
of first impression. 4 The facts underlying Norman would repulse
any reasonable person's sensibilities and cause moral indignation
actually or apparently was necessary under the circumstances. Id. at 70-71, 357
S.E.2d at 659. An instruction on imperfect self-defense is appropriate when the
evidence tends to support the existence of only the first two elements. State v.
Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 159, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982). Perfect self-defense is a
justification for homicide. If a homicide is 'justified," the defendant is exonerated
and is entitled to an acquittal. At common law, the law "excused" crimes if the
unique characteristics of the defendant rendered him less blameworthy.
Imperfect self-defense, a common-law "excuse," may afford a defendant a
mitigated sentence, but does not guarantee acquittal.
10. See Gappins, 320 N.C. at 71-73, 357 S.E.2d at 659-660; State v. Mize, 316
N.C. 48, 49-50, 340 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1986); State v. Wilson, 304 N.C. 689, 695-
696, 285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1992); State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 528, 279 S.E.2d
570, 572 (1981).
11. Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's
Defense:" Towards A New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URBAN L.J., 567, 580
(1992).
12. MODEL PENAL CODE 3.04(1).
13. State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
14. Id.
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that such atrocities could be inflicted upon a human being in this
country without the law interceding to protect the victim.
To paraphrase the Court's facts-without minimalizing the
physical and mental abuse Judy Norman endured-her plight
began five years into her 20 years of marriage. 15 Her husband's
physical abuse of her consisted of frequent assaults that included
slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her with various
objects, and throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at
her. 16 Other specific incidents of abuse included her husband put-
ting his cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee on her, and
breaking glass against her face and crushing food on her face; in
fact, Judy Norman attributed several scars about her face to her
husband's assaults. 17
Other indignities inflicted upon Judy Norman by her husband
included the fact that her husband did not work and forced her to
make money by prostitution; that he made humor of this fact to
family and friends; that he would beat her if she resisted going out
to prostitute herself or if he was not satisfied with the amount of
money she made; that he routinely called the defendant "dog,"
"bitch" and "whore," and on a few occasions made her eat pet food
out of the pets' bowls and bark like a dog."1 Further, her husband
often made her sleep on the floor. 19 At times, he deprived her of
food and refused to allow her to get food for the family. During
those years of abuse, Judy Norman's husband threatened numer-
ous times to kill her and to maim her in various ways.2 °
Judy Norman said her husband's abuse occurred only when
he was intoxicated but that he would not give up drinking.2 ' She
said that she and her husband "got along very well when he was
sober" and that he was "a good guy" when he was not drunk.22
She had accompanied her husband to the local mental health
center for sporadic counseling sessions for his problem, but he con-
tinued to drink.23
These years of abuse culminated with an incident where Judy
Norman's husband was charged with DWI while returning home
15. Id. at 255, 378 S.E.2d at 10.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 256, 378 S.E.2d at 10.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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with her from prostituting.24 After being released from jail, he
resumed drinking and abusing her.25 Judy Norman summoned
the sheriffs office but then refused to take out a warrant on her
husband.2 6 She then attempted suicide.27 Later the following
day, she shot her husband while he was sleeping.28
Judy Norman was charged with first-degree murder, and the
jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 29 She was sen-
tenced to six years imprisonment.3 0 The Court of Appeals granted
a new trial, citing as error the trial court's refusal to submit a
possible verdict of acquittal by reason of perfect self-defense.3 ' In
so doing, the Court of Appeals recognized evidence of battered
spouse syndrome as sufficient to support a defense of self-defense,
even where the victim was asleep and death or great bodily harm
to the defendant was not imminent.3 2 The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Our Supreme Court recognized that the right of self-defense
"springs from a primal impulse and is an inherent right of natural
law."3 3 The Court then set forth the law in North Carolina as it
relates to the perfect right of self-defense:
In North Carolina, a defendant is entitled to have the jury con-
sider acquittal by reason of perfect self-defense when the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, tends to show
that at the time of the killing it appeared to the defendant and she
believed it to be necessary to kill the decedent to save herself from
imminent death or great bodily harm. That belief must be reason-
able, however, in that the circumstances as they appeared to the
defendant would create such a belief in the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness. Further, the defendant must not have been the
initial aggressor provoking the fatal confrontation. A killing in
the proper exercise of the right of perfect self-defense is always
completely justified in law and constitutes no legal wrong.34
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 257, 378 S.E.2d at 11.
29. Id. at 254, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 258-59, 378 S.E.2d at 12.
32. Id. at 259, 378 S.E.2d at 12.
33. Id. (citing State v. Holland, 193 N.C. 713, 138 S.E.8 (1927)).
34. Id. at 260, 378 S.E.2d at 12.
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The Court held that the defendant in Norman was not enti-
tled to a jury instruction on perfect self-defense.35 Likewise, and
for additional reasons, the Court also found that the defendant
was not entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense.3 6
The trial court was not required to instruct on either form of self-
defense unless evidence was introduced tending to show that at
the time of the killing the defendant reasonably believed herself to
be confronted by circumstances which necessitated her killing her
husband to save herself from imminent death or great bodily
harm.3 7
Under North Carolina law, no such evidence was introduced
in Norman, and it would have been error for the trial court to
instruct the jury on either perfect or imperfect self-defense.
The same could be said in Frankie Silver's case, depending on
which version of the facts you believe. The transcript of her
trial-if one were made-no longer exists, and the oral and writ-
ten accounts are rife with inconsistencies. The facts from her case
on appeal offer nothing to shed light on her defense, if any.38 No
statement of the facts exists in the opinion from the Supreme
Court of North Carolina other than that "[t]he defendant was
indicted for murder."39
Many of the various factual possibilities surrounding this kill-
ing are almost wholly inconsistent with any notion of self-defense,
such as Frankie striking the first blow in a jealous rage or that
Charles was asleep when struck. Other theories also negate such
a defense. Among the theories that exist is that Frankie was
aided in the killing by members of her family either in the actual
crime or in attempting to cover it up. This theory is supported by
the fact that two of her family members-her mother and a
brother-were also indicted, but no true bill was returned as to
them.40  Thus, there is no hard evidence to support this
conjecture.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 260, 378 S.E.2d at 12 (citing State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d
439 (1986)).
38. State v. Silver, 14 N.C. 271 (1832). On appeal the Court addressed only a
very technical question regarding sequestration of witnesses.
39. Id. at 271.
40. CLII-rON K. AVERY, OFFICIAL COURT RECORD OF THE TRiAL, CONVICTION,
AND EXECUTION OF FRANCIs SILVER (Clifton K. Avery, ed., 1953). This book is a
reprint, in booklet form, of a series of newspaper columns written by Mr. Avery
regarding the trial.
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The only evidence to support a defense of self-defense, based
on the battered spouse syndrome or otherwise, is contained in a
few contemporary accounts and some recorded oral history. Vari-
ous letters and petitions to the governors of that period asking for
commutation make reference either to the abuses of Charles Sil-
ver inflicted upon his wife or to self-defense as a defense. For
instance, an undated petition (believed to have been sent between
the trial and the date of the fall term of Superior Court) addressed
to Governor Stokes, and signed by 94 of the most prominent men
of Burke County, states "[tihe only inducement on the part of the
defendant for commission of the alleged offense was that of brutal
conduct of the husband toward the wife - as appeared in evi-
dence."4 ' Most interesting is a letter from Thomas W. Wilson, an
attorney and most likely Frankie Silver's trial counsel, to Gover-
nor Swain, who succeeded Governor Stokes in December of 1832,
which alludes to a confession made by Frankie following the affir-
mation of her sentence by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The confession was before Wilson, John Boone, the newly elected
Sheriff (and believed to be a nephew of Daniel Boone), and a third
person. In the letter, Wilson states that following
a rigid examination & cross examination we were all of the opin-
ion that it was clearly a case of manslaughter if not justifiable
homicide[. Tihis was always my opinion from the circumstances
proved and if the facts could have been proved as they really were
that it would have amounted to no more than manslaughter.42
Wilson then insinuates that Frankie did not confess when ini-
tially indicted out of fear that it would be used against her mother
and brother. After restating the facts and the improbability of the
State's version of the events, Wilson writes, "[s]he must have
killed him by some unlucky blow not premeditated."43 He blames
Frankie's conviction on the re-examination of previously seques-
tered witnesses after the jury initially retired (i.e., the sole, and
technical, issue reviewed by the Supreme Court).
Other evidence is purely recorded oral history, such as the
report prepared by then attorney Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of Morganton,
which appeared in the Morganton News-Herald on April 3, 1924,
or Kemp Plummer Battle's interview with Nicholas Woodfin found
in his book Memories of an Old-Time Tar Heel. Ervin wrote:
41. Stokes Papers, Gov. Papers 65, 340-341.
42. Swain Papers, Gov. Papers 67, 209-210.
43. Id.
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The story of Frankie Silver is tragic in several respects. The late
Col. B. S. Gaither, who was the youthful clerk of the Superior
Court at the time of her trial and execution and who witnessed a
remarkable memory, was wont to assert that she would not have
been convicted if the truth had been disclosed at the trial.
According to Col. Gaither, Silver mistreated his wife and she
killed him in protection of herself. And he always maintained the
opinion that if the defense had admitted the killing the jury would
probably have found her act justified and would have acquitted
her.
The defense, however, was a denial that the hand of Frankie Sil-
ver struck the fatal blow and there being evidence of her guilt, the
jury following the instinct of the sleuth which lurks in every
human mind, promptly convicted her of wilful murder.4
4
Further, in a chapter entitled "A Trip to the Mountains in
1848," Battle included the following observations by Nicholas A.
Woodfin:
Not long before [Woodfin's] death I asked him about the case. He
replied earnestljin substance, "She was unjustly hung. Her story
was reasonable and told with every evidence of sincerity. Her hus-
band came home drunk and began to beat her with a stick; she
struck back and killed him. She did not intend to kill him, but
only to keep him from beating her. She tried to hide the body by
cutting it up and burning it. She did not know the difference
between murder and manslaughter or self-defense. The law at
that time did not allow her to testify in court and she was con-
victed. If she could have told her story to the jury, the result
would have been different. I rode through the mountains three
weeks to get signatures to her plea for pardon. I got a goodly
number but Gov. Swain refused to interfere. It was a miscarriage
of justice, sir."4 5
As mentioned above, Frankie's court case was further com-
pounded by an interesting piece of juristic history. At the time of
her trial, a defendant could not testify on his or her own behalf;
this provision of law was not repealed until 1881.46 Thus,
44. See Ervin, supra note 5.
45. Id. at 90-91. Battle states that Woodfin was Frankie's trial attorney.
Other evidence indicates that this description of Woodfin's role is almost
certainly erroneous. Most likely, Thomas Wilson represented Frankie during
and after her trial. Woodfin was, however, active in the post-trial efforts to gain
executive clemency for Frankie.
46. See BATTLE, supra note 45, at Chap. 44 (1873); Laws And Resolutions Of
1881, Chap. 110, § 1.
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because, at least ostensibly, there were no other witnesses to
Charles Silver's death other than the one-year-old baby, any
defense for Frankie would have been virtually impossible to pres-
ent in an 1830's court of law in this State.
Further evidence of self-defense, although without attribu-
tion, is found in a letter to the editor of the Lenoir-Topic from a
Henry Spainhour, published in the May 7, 1886, Morganton Star.
This letter sets forth the self-defense story as confessed to by
Frankie, including the assertion that Charles was awake at the
time of the first blow with the axe. The fact that the victim was
awake would be crucial to any defense-both in 1831 and in
1996-in North Carolina. Further, because it is not possible to
prove the "imminence" of death or great bodily harm in North Car-
olina where the victim is sleeping, this fact would be extremely
crucial to the defense of self-defense.
The North Carolina Supreme Court expounded on the legal
and philosophical roots of self-defense in Norman and discussed
the necessity of the imminence requirement.
The term "imminent," as used to describe such perceived threats
of death or great bodily harm as will justify a homicide by reason
of perfect self-defense, has been defined as "immediate danger,
such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against
by calling for the assistance of others or the protection of the law."
[citation omitted] Our cases have sometimes used the phrase
"about to suffer" interchangeably with "imminent" to describe the
immediacy of threat that is required to justify killing in self-
defense.47
In Norman, the Court found that the evidence "did not tend to
show that the defendant reasonably believed that she was con-
fronted by a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm."4"
The evidence in Norman-as well as in the Frankie Silver case, if
you accept the most frequently proffered version of the facts, that
Charles Silver was asleep--did not show an "imminent" harm or
that anything was about to happen when the defendant fatally
attacked her husband. In the case of Frankie Silver, again,
according to the most frequently proffered facts, Frankie Silver's
husband had been sleeping by the fire with the baby in his arms
when Frankie slipped the baby from his grasp and attempted to
decapitate him with an axe. The first blow was not mortal, and
47. Norman, 324 N.C. at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (citing Holland, 193 N.C. at
718, 138 S.E.2d at 10).
48. Id.
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her husband jumped to his feet. The final confrontation resulted
in blood being spattered on the fireplace mantel. Similarly, in
Norman, the victim had been asleep for some time when the
defendant walked to her mother's home, retrieved a pistol,
returned to her home, and shot her husband three times; she even
cleared the pistol after it jammed.49 Subsequently, in neither
instance was the defendant faced with an "instantaneous choice
between killing . . .or being killed or seriously injured."50 Not
only was no assault or other action underway by the respective
victims at the time of the fatal assaults by the respective defend-
ants, but neither had an assault or other action occurred immedi-
ately prior to the victims falling asleep.51 It is on this point that
the battered spouse syndrome advocates twist the traditional view
of the defense of self-defense. Norman summarized the problem
with this departure.52
Prior to analyzing the various scholarly publications recogniz-
ing the existence of "battered spouse syndrome," the Court in Nor-
man set forth the precedential case, State v. Mize,53 in support of
its conclusion that a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction
on either perfect or imperfect self-defense when the defendant
goes to the victim and initiates the final, fatal confrontation,
regardless of the reasonableness of his belief.54 In Mize, the vic-
tim had reportedly been looking for the defendant to avenge the
rape of his girlfriend by the defendant;5 the defendant hid from
the victim for most of the day.56 After coming out of hiding, the
defendant went to the victim's home, awakened him, and then
shot and killed him.5 7 The defendant claimed that he feared the
victim was going to kill him and that his killing of the victim was
in self-defense. In rejecting the defendant's contention in Mize,
the Court stated:
Here, although the victim had pursued defendant during the day
approximately eight hours before the killing, defendant Mize was
in no imminent danger while [the victim] was at home asleep.
When Mize went to [the victim's] trailer with his shotgun, it was a
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 262, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
52. Id. at 265-66, 378 S.E.2d at 15-16.
53. 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d 439 (1986).
54. Norman, 324 N.C. at 262, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
55. Mize, 316 N.C. at 49, 340 S.E.2d at 440.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 50, 340 S.E.2d at 440.
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new confrontation. Therefore, even if Mize believed it was neces-
sary to kill [the victim] to avoid his own imminent death, that
belief was unreasonable. 58
The Court in Mize then established that a defendant's subjec-
tive belief that death or serious bodily injury might be "inevitable"
at some indefinite point in the future does not equate to "immi-
nent." Thus, in Frankie Silver's case-as in Norman-the defend-
ant's belief that the victim might kill her, at some point in the
future (such as if she left him), would have been an insufficient
basis for an instruction on self-defense.
Therefore, whether in 1832 or in modem times, the rationale
of Norman would control Frankie Silver's fate. Under this ration-
ale, if the victim is asleep, a defendant cannot avail herself of the
defense of self-defense in North Carolina, even if the battered
spouse syndrome can be proved.
Seven years after Norman, the North Carolina Supreme
Court was again faced with the question of the battered spouse
syndrome in State v. Grant.59 In this most recent case, the
defendant had secreted a large, serrated knife under the couch
prior to the murder.60 After her husband had been asleep on the
couch for a number of hours, she arose in the morning, retrieved
the knife, and stabbed him in the heart.6 ' When the stab wound
proved not to be fatal, she shot him three times with a very power-
ful pistol.62 She then feigned a breaking and entering, and drove
to her parents to establish an alibi. 3 She later confessed her
crime. Uncontroverted expert testimony that the defendant suf-
fered from battered spouse syndrome was presented at trial.6 4
In this case, as well as in other similar cases from jurisdic-
tions which are in accord with North Carolina in their view of self-
defense, the argument was raised that the law should be
changed.65 Arguing that, viewed through the eyes of a battered
spouse, the act of killing is justifiable, defense attorneys and advo-
cacy groups contend that self-defense should be available as a
defense in cases such as Norman and Grant. In contrast, how-
58. Id. at 53, 340 S.E.2d at 442 (citations omitted).
59. State v. Grant, 343 N.C. 289, 469 S.E.2d 1 (1996).
60. Id. at 290, 469 S.E.2d at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 291, 470 S.E.2d at 1.
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ever, those legal reasons set forth by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Norman are sound. In summary, the Court stated:
As we have stated, stretching the law of self-defense to fit the facts
of this case would require changing the "imminent death or great
bodily harm" requirement to something substantially more indefi-
nite than previously required and would weaken our assurances
that justification for the taking of human life remains firmly
rooted in real or apparent necessity. That result in principle could
not be limited to a few cases decided on evidence as poignant as
this. The relaxed requirements for perfect self-defense proposed
by our Court of Appeals would tend to categorically legalize the
opportune killing of abusive husbands by their wives solely on the
basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjective specula-
tion as to the probability of future felonious assaults by their hus-
bands. Homicidal self-help would then become a lawful solution,
and perhaps the easiest and most effective solution, to this
problem. 66
The Court declined to expand North Carolina's law of self-
defense and affirmed that decision in Grant. In all likelihood,
North Carolina courts will decline to do so again if presented with
the same issue in the future. The limits of immediacy and neces-
sity which have, in all prior cases, provided an appropriately nar-
row, but firm, basis upon which a homicide may be justified
continue to serve our State well. Although great sympathy for the
Frankie Silvers of this country may exist,6 7 no compelling justifi-
cation for altering this long standing law can be shown. The solu-
tion lies somewhere other than in the criminal law jurisprudence.
Even the so-called experts do not agree in their arguments for
a change in the law of self-defense. In Norman, the Court made
mention of two scholarly works, with varying theories, regarding
spousal abuse as a justification for homicide. 68 Since the Court's
opinion in Norman, such works have multiplied. The Norman
decision has been central to many of these writings. As yet, no
single work or collection of works has proven to be compelling
enough to override the Court's legitimate public and legal policy
concerns avowed in Norman. Even Justice Martin's strong, well-
written dissent in Norman contains fallacies in its ultimate con-
66. Norman, 324 N.C. at 265, 378 S.E.2d at 15 (citation omitted).
67. Even in Frankie's time which was restrictive of women's rights women
rallied in her defense. Once the abuse version of the story became widely
circulated, 34 of Burke County's most influential women signed a petition to the
Governor asking for mercy. Swain Papers, Gov. Papers 67, 261-262.
68. Norman, 324 N.C. at 265-66, 378 S.E.2d at 15-16.
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clusions, in addition to the difference of legal opinion from the
majority.
Research and writing on the battered spouse syndrome
abounds, as well as scholarly works addressing the various theo-
ries of self-defense. Worthy of mention first is the mother of bat-
tered spouse research, Lenore E. Walker. She authored the
original article in 1977 which gave rise to the now generally
accepted "cycles of domestic violence" theory, two books, and
numerous law review articles, all of which refer to the battered
woman/wife/spouse syndrome as a mental health disorder. 9
Other mental health experts, as well, have construed the bat-
tering relationship as deviant and recognize it to be a psychologi-
cal malady.7 °
The approaches of the research and writings are from varying
legal jurisprudential angles. Much of the writings address the
syndrome from a particular standpoint.71 Others approach the
question from a broad-based argument regarding the criminal
law, generally, and advocate alteration of the traditional defini-
tions of self-defense. 72 These scholars generally have analyzed
this question from a stereotyping and equal protection angle,73 as
well as from a pure feminist standpoint of writing.7 a While the
overwhelming body of research has recognized the existence of
such a syndrome and advocated, for various reasons, an adapta-
69. See supra note 6.
70. See, e.g., Donileen R. Loseke & Spencer E. Cahill, The Social Construction
of Deviance: Experts on Battered Women, 31 Soc. PROBS. 296 (1984).
71. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims,
67 OR. L. REV. 393 (1988); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The
Battered Women Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L.
REV. 545 (1988); Erich D. Anderson & Anne Read-Anderson, Constitutional
Dimensions of Battered Women's Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363 (1992).
72. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who
Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1993); Walter W. Steele & Christine W.
Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self-Defense to Accommodate Battered
Women, 18 Am J. CRIM. L. 169 (1991).
73. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986);
Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 HAR. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985).
74. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1994);
Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV.
421 (1992).
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tion of the criminal law, a few writings have refuted the theory
and opposed any change in the criminal law to accommodate bat-
tered women.75
Many of these writings discuss, or at least mention, Norman,
and Norman has been the subject of an exhaustive law review
note.7 6 Still other writings address the broader questions, both
legal and psychological, of disproportionality in sentencing wives
that murder husbands, "learned helplessness," and dysfunctional
families, generally. To all of these writings should be added those
cited by the Supreme Court in Norman.77
However, one cannot get bogged down in the intellectual swirl
of legal and psychological debate over the battered spouse syn-
drome. Some simple facts remain. First, as previously stated,
this so-called "syndrome", as documented as it may be, is not rec-
ognized as a mental illness and does not appear in the widely rec-
ognized, frequently relied upon, and oft quoted persuasive
authority the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM IV). Second, the Court's opinion in Norman is legally
sound and no compelling reason has been, nor can be, shown to
reverse or modify that opinion. The decision rests on sound public
and legal policy considerations.
The reasonableness of the belief and "imminence" are the
essential elements of perfect self-defense. The evaluation of the
reasonableness of a defendant's actions usually hinges upon the
imminence of the threat to the defendant. The requirement that
the attack be imminent is a sensible one and ensures that killing
the attacker is used only as a last resort. "Imminence" is what
defines the scope of events or circumstances the jury is permitted
to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant's
actions. Concomitantly, any change in such a definition may limit
or broaden the scope.
75. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE GENDER QUESTION IN CRIMINAL
LAW, CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 105 (1990); Molly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 V. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991); Stephen J. Morse, The Misbegotten
Marriage of Soft Psychology and Bad Law: Psychological Self-Defense and a
Justification for Homicide, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 595 (1990); Mira Mihajlovich,
Note, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony
and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L. J. 1253 (1987).
76. Kerry A. Shad, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered
Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (1990).
77. Norman, 324 N.C. at 264-266, 378 S.E.2d at 15-16.
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The ramifications of changing this definition was the root of
the Court's opinion in Norman. To tamper with that root threat-
ens not only the trunk and branches, but the life of the entire tree.
Why such a bold statement? Because to change the definition of
"imminence" to adapt the law to fit any notion of a "syndrome," the
North Carolina Supreme Court-or any other state court consid-
ering this question-must, in turn, alter the "reasonable person
standard" found throughout the civil and criminal law. This point
is pivotal in not only Justice Martin's dissent in Norman, but also
in all the scholarly works which his dissent reflects.
In order to alter the law to accommodate a "battered spouse,"
an appellate court or legislature must allow the jury to measure
the defendant's conduct against that of a "reasonable battered
spouse." Based on testimony tending to establish the presence of
battered spouse syndrome, Justice Martin concluded that the bat-
tered spouse's fear that "one day her husband [would] kill her in
the course of a beating" created an honest belief that "danger
[was] constantly 'immediate.'"78 According to Justice Martin, this
state of mind, unique to the syndrome, served to distinguish the
reasonableness of the spouse's perception of imminence from that
of the defendant in all other cases, such as those cited above.79
To do as Justice Martin and certain other respected scholars
have suggested would transform an objective standard into a
purely subjective standard. Justifying a battered spouse's actions
on the basis of psychological characteristics not present in the
ordinary reasonable person goes against the grain of many basic
theories of our American jurisprudence.
Under the current law (i.e., Norman, Gappins, Mize, etc.),
anyone acting in a manner similar to the facts in illustrative cases
cited by the Court is entitled to an acquittal based on justification.
This is the basis of the justification theory that is the core of per-
fect self-defense. To reverse or modify this concept as suggested
by various defense attorneys, advocacy groups, and legal scholars
would, in the words of Professor Rosen, allow a jury to acquit
based on "an identifiable psychological syndrome that caused [the
battered spouse] to assess the dangerousness of the situation in a
different manner than an average, ordinary person."80
78. Norman, 324 N.C. at 270-271, 378 S.E.2d at 18-19 (Martin, J., dissenting)
(quoting Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
HASTINGs L. J. 895, 928-29 (1981).
79. Id.
80. See Rosen, supra note 73, at 41-42, n. 170.
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North Carolina employs a very narrow definition of immi-
nence which requires an evaluation of the victim's actions at the
moment of the killing. This rule is supported by the belief that
requiring an immediate threat prevents unnecessary self-help. As
a matter of public policy, a narrow interpretation of "imminence"
reflects society's belief that every human life is valuable-regard-
less of how disgusting or contemptible the person's behavior.
While the State should be, and is, certainly sympathetic to any
battered spouse, it cannot allow such a spouse to sentence to death
a person who has merely threatened to kill at some earlier time.
More than a history of severe beatings, psychological domination,
and threats of death must occur before self-defense becomes avail-
able; death or great bodily harm at the hands of the person must
be imminent. Regardless of the need for punishment (and most
batterers "need killing," as they say in the mountains of western
North Carolina), batterers are no less entitled to the equal protec-
tion of their lives. The general determination offered by North
Carolina's narrowly construed imminence requirement provides
that protection.
Norman is a correct application of the existing law in North
Carolina and it is as sound today as it was eight years ago.
Despite the heart-felt sympathy that must go out to a battered
spouse, despite the longing to help when a battered spouse's story
comes to light, and despite the scholarly writings espousing the
existence of a syndrome and advocating change in the traditional
rule of law, modification of the law of self-defense is not an appro-
priate means to remedy the dilemma facing a person who may suf-
fer symptoms of "battered spouse syndrome." Although the State
should sympathize with such a situation, it cannot accommodate
the few at the expense of general principles of deterrence and
equal protection of human life.
As for Frankie Silver, in modern times it would still be an
uphill battle for her to show that her husband was awake and she
feared for her life when she struck the fatal blow. As it was in
1830's frontier North Carolina, she had much more to hinder her
struggle: the public perception of her false story of Charles's dis-
appearance, her attempts to hide her crime, and her unwilling-
ness to admit or confess her guilt; the lack of a competent witness
to the acts; the legal bar to her testifying in her own defense; and
an all-male jury. Each of these worked to her disadvantage.
While her conduct following the death of Charles can be explained
away by the broad, sweeping and myriad symptoms of the bat-
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tered spouse syndrome, other facts-such as the relative size of
Charles as compared to her size-would be to her disadvantage in
proving he was awake at the time of the killing.
As a historical note, one other factor would also have been to
her disadvantage and possibly would have dispelled any notion of
self-defense being used. While at least one version of the story has
Charles Silver loading his gun to shoot Frankie when she struck,
the more universal version has him threatening to beat her with a
stick of unknown size. At the time of this alleged assault, a hus-
band had a right to give his wife "correction" and "moderate chas-
tisement," including striking her with his fists, as long as no
permanent injury was inflicted; the husband was the sole judge of
the reason and necessity for chastisement. 81 Therefore, depend-
ing on the severity of the beating, self-defense may not even have
been a possible defense until the assault escalated beyond mere
chastisement.
CONCLUSION
So, was Frankie Silver, the first woman hanged for murder in
North Carolina, a battered spouse? Most likely, at least by today's
standards. However, under the law and mores of her time, her
situation was probably not unusual.
Like most frontier marriages, the Silvers' marriage was built
on one part love and most parts necessity. Living was essentially
day-to-day, the male was often dominant, and hard drinking was
common. Physical abuse and "battering" of a wife was accepted.
Families were isolated, and females, especially, lacked a support
group. While a strong case can be made that Frankie Silver was a
battered spouse, it is all for naught; for then, as now, any defense
based on such a malady was not available to her.
At best, the evidence of being an abused and battered spouse
could have acted to mitigate Frankie Silver's act. Judy Norman,
for example was charged with first-degree murder but only found
guilty of voluntary manslaughter after the presentation of the
horrendous evidence of her abuse. While the defense of self-
defense was not available to her, the evidence of the battered
spouse syndrome certainly must have acted in her favor. The
same could have been true for Frankie Silver. Her post-trial coun-
81. See State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 127 (1852).
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sel, Thomas W. Wilson, professed in a letter to Governor Swain
that she was guilty of "no more than manslaughter."8 2
The story of Frankie Silver lends to the immediacy of her
timeless plight. In many ways, she possibly was no different than
Judy Norman. Judy Norman's sentence was commuted by the
Governor to time-served on July 7, 1989, three months after the
North Carolina Supreme Court re-instated her conviction.
Frankie Silver was not so fortunate. Despite numerous petitions
(including one signed by seven members of her jury) and letters,
as well as untold numbers of personal contacts, two Governors
refused to extend clemency. To this day, school children of Burke
County petition the Governor as a class project attempting to
obtain a pardon. The facts of Frankie Silver's unfortunate saga-
forever clouded in myth, legend, and inconsistency-will forever
tie her to the verdict of GUILTY OF MURDER.
82. See supra note 40.
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